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Abstract—Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) has been
recognized as one of the most significant enabling technologies
for future wireless systems due to its eminent spectral efficiency,
ability to provide an additional degree of freedom for Ultra
Reliable Low Latency Communications (URLLC) and grant free
random access. Meanwhile, Physical Layer Security (PLS) has got
much attention for future wireless communication systems due to
its capability to provide security without relying on traditional
cryptography based algorithms. In this article, security design
requirements for NOMA and solutions provided by PLS to fulfill
these requirements are discussed. The merits and challenges aris-
ing from employing PLS to NOMA are identified. Finally, future
recommendations and prospective solutions are also presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOn-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) has receivedsignificant attention for 5G and beyond wireless systems
due to its unique properties such as high spectral efficiency,
low latency, improved coverage, massive connectivity, fairness
and so on [1]. However, there are some critical security risks
in NOMA, for example, due to the broadcast of messages from
multiple users at the same time over the same resources, there
is a risk that an eavesdropper can overhear the information
of multiple users if NOMA transmission is successfully in-
tercepted. Moreover, in NOMA, there is a need of securing
confidential messages from each other in case of untrusted
users.
The conventional solutions to provide secure communica-
tion in NOMA and other wireless technologies are based
on cryptography, but they are not enough for future com-
munication [2] due to the following reasons: Firstly, future
networks consist of decentralized and heterogeneous wireless
networks in which key management processes are quite chal-
lenging. Secondly, future networks need to support new wire-
less technologies such as Internet of Things (IoT) including
both massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC) and
Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communications (URLLC). The
transceiver devices in these wireless technologies are naturally
power-limited, processing-restricted and delay-sensitive which
make cryptography-based techniques infeasible for such type
of technologies. Thirdly, future networks are expected to sup-
port diverse services and scenarios that have different levels of
security requirements. However, the encryption-based methods
can only provide binary level of security [2]. To cope up
with these problems, Physical Layer Security (PLS) techniques
have emerged as a promising solution that can complement and
may even replace the cryptography based approaches [3]. PLS
exploits the dynamic features of wireless communications, for
example, random channel, fading, interference and noise, etc.,
to prevent the eavesdropper from decoding data while ensuring
that the legitimate user can decode it successfully [2]. PLS
has the following advantages with respect to future networks
as compared to cryptography. Firstly, PLS approaches can be
exploited to extract keys from the channel that is common
between legitimate transmitter and receiver, thus avoiding key
management issues. Secondly, some of the PLS approaches
can be implemented by relatively simple signal processing
techniques which make it suitable for processing-restricted and
delay-sensitive services. Thirdly, in PLS, channel-dependent
resource allocation and link adaptation can be designed to
provide flexible and scenario-specific security schemes [3].
On the basis of the potential of PLS for future networks
and security concerns in NOMA, designing PLS techniques
for NOMA seems more promising than cryptography-based
approaches. However, there is still a paucity of research
works in this direction [4]. In this article, we first provide
a quick overview of NOMA flavors and basic principles to
explain security concerns more clearly. This is followed by
security design objectives and solutions provided by PLS.
Then, we present the merits of PLS in NOMA as compared
to Orthogonal Multiple Access (OMA). Challenges of PLS in
NOMA, possible solutions, and future directions are addressed
in the following section. The final section concludes the article.
II. DOMINANT FLAVORS AND SYSTEM MODEL
FOR NOMA
In this section, different types of NOMA, basic system
model and NOMA principles are presented to explain the
security designs more clearly in subsequent sections.
A. NOMA Dominant Flavors
NOMA supports massive connectivity and enhanced spec-
tral efficiency by allowing resource allocation in non-
orthogonal manner. There are two basic types of NOMA
schemes: Power-Domain (PD) NOMA and Code-Domain
(CD) NOMA [1]. In PD-NOMA, different users’ signals
are directly superimposed by assigning channel quality-based
power allocation to them, while sharing the same frequency-
time resources. CD-NOMA, on the other hand, is similar
to Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), where different
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Fig. 1. Downlink NOMA detailed model which consists of a single Base Station (BS) with one Near User (NU) and one Far User (FU) in the presence of
an external eavesdropper (cloned at different possible positions)
users are allowed to share same frequency-time resources by
using unique orthogonal spreading code in CDMA. How-
ever, CD-NOMA uses non-orthogonal codes with lower cross
correlation or sparse sequences. Generally speaking, there is
more attention to downlink PD-NOMA, especially in the stan-
dardization bodies such as the Third Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP) and IEEE. For example, a downlink version of
PD-NOMA has been proposed for 3GPP-LTE-Advanced [5].
Moreover, we do not need to do major changes in the physical
layer procedures at the transmitter in case of downlink PD-
NOMA compared to conventional technologies. Also, from
the PLS point of view for NOMA, most of the work in
the literature is focused on downlink PD-NOMA. The reason
is that downlink PD-NOMA has novel challenges in terms
of security due to its unique implementation. Firstly, due to
the broadcast of superimposed messages of multiple users at
the same time, there is a risk of information leakage of the
superimposed users. Secondly, near user has to decode the
signal of the far user, which causes a serious security risk for
the far user in the case of an untrusted near user. Furthermore,
the channel availability of users and other resources can be
exploited at the base station (BS) to tackle security challenges
of downlink NOMA. Hence, this paper will mainly focus on
PLS techniques applied to downlink PD-NOMA to elaborate
the novel challenges and future recommendations for it.1
B. System Model and Principles of NOMA
Consider a simple two-user downlink NOMA scenario that
consists of a single Base Station (BS) with one Near User
(NU) and one Far User (FU) in the presence of an external
eavesdropper (cloned at different possible positions) as pre-
sented in Fig. 1. The BS first superimposes the users’ signals
by allocating them different power levels and broadcasts the
mixture to all users using the same time-frequency resources.
The power allocation in NOMA is done in such a way that the
FU (user with lower channel gain) is allocated more power and
1Note that we will use the term NOMA in the remaining part of the paper
to represent PD-NOMA.
NU (user with higher channel gain) is given low power. The
receivers of NOMA employ different strategies for different
users in accordance with their channel characteristics. More
specifically, the NU has to decode the signal intended for FU
first, afterwards it subtracts the detected signal from the re-
ceived signal and then decodes its intended data. This process
is known as Successive Interference Cancellation (SIC). On
the other hand, the FU directly decodes its own information
while considering the information of its partner as noise [6]. It
should be noted that for the sake of explanation two users case
is considered here; however, the discussion is also applicable
to multiple users (more than two) case.
The above mentioned case is for single-input-single-output
(SISO)-NOMA, where channels are represented by scalars.
However, matrices are used to represent the channels of multi-
input-multi-output (MIMO)-NOMA. In the case of matrices,
ordering of users based on power is quite challenging [1].
In the literature, two main designs are proposed for MIMO-
NOMA case: 1) Beamformer based MIMO-NOMA, where
different beams are allocated to different users and SIC is
employed at users sharing the same resource block [1], 2)
Cluster based MIMO-NOMA, where users are divided into
clusters and a single beam can serve all the users in the cluster.
In this approach, SIC is adopted among users sharing the same
cluster [1].
III. SECURITY DESIGNS OBJECTIVES
In this section, different security design objectives for
NOMA are presented and explained. In general, different
users in NOMA can have different Quality-of-Service (QoS)
requirements, which implies that the design of PLS techniques
should consider these requirements. Moreover, there are two
types of eavesdroppers : 1) External, and 2) Internal. Internal
eavesdropper is from the set of legitimate users of the network,
while the external one is not from that set. The eavesdropper
can be considered 1) active, which is the case when its
channel state information is available at transmitter, or 2)
passive, which is the case when its CSI is not available at the
3transmitter. Usually, internal eavesdroppers are active while
the external eavesdroppers are passive.
This work is focused on both active internal eavesdropping
as well as passive external eavesdropping. The objectives of
security design for NOMA can be divided into three major
categories based on its requirements as follows:
• Security designs against external eavesdroppers.
• Security designs against internal eavesdroppers.
• Security designs against both internal and external eaves-
droppers.
The details of security designs and solutions provided by PLS
are presented in subsequent part.
A. Security Designs against External Eavesdroppers
In this scenario, NU and FU are trusted. So, the design goal
here is to secure the messages of NU and FU from an external
eavesdropper. Based on the basic model presented in Fig. 1,
there are five possibilities for Eves location: 1) Eve can be
closer to BS than NU, which means its channel is better than
both users, 2) Eve can be at the same distance from BS as NU,
3) Eve can be somewhere between NU and FU, which means
that its channel is better than FU but worse than NU, 4) Eve
can be at the same distance from BS just like FU, 5) Eve can
be at the farthest location from BS as compared to NU and
FU, which means its channel condition is worst as compared
to them. On the basis of these possibilities, it should be noted
that the location of Eve can affect the security performance
of NOMA system and should be considered while designing
security algorithms.
The necessary conditions that need to be taken into con-
sideration while designing algorithms for this scenario are as
follows: Firstly, the basic SIC should be normally operated
with the security algorithm, which means that the proposed
algorithm should not affect the basic SIC process and the per-
formance of normal NOMA. Secondly, the algorithm should
also work even in the case of having strong spatial similarity
between channels of legitimate parties and illegitimate parties.
It should be pointed out that in the case of NOMA, different
users are allocated with different power levels due to which
they are protected in an unequal manner and thus experiencing
asymmetric security performance. More specifically, users
with weak channel conditions are allocated more power.
Hence, they are less secure because the probability of their
detection at Eve is more as compared to NU signal with less
allocated power. Therefore, advanced algorithms are needed
to ensure that different security targets of different users can
be met.
The popular PLS techniques for external eavesdropping
in the literature include channel based optimization of the
power allocation for each user, subcarrier assignment to users,
channel ordering of NOMA users along with the decoding
order, optimization of beamforming policies, adding interfere
signal, Transmit Antenna Selection (TAS) approaches and
inter-user interference exploitation, etc. [3][7].
B. Security Designs against Internal Eavesdroppers
In this scenario, no external eavesdropper is assumed; how-
ever, the users are untrusted. The design goal here is to secure
information of users from each other, while making sure that
the SIC operation works normally. Moreover, in this case, the
channel is known at the BS, which makes the design process
different than the previous case. Internal eavesdropping can be
divided into two types:
• Eavesdropping of FU by NU
• Eavesdropping of NU by FU
The details of these two types are as follows:
1) Eavesdropping of FU by NU: In basic NOMA principle,
the main security risk for FU is that the NU has to decode
(or demodulate) the signal of FU in order to apply SIC.
Another important thing is that the FU’s signal is allocated
more power, which makes its detection easier for the NU. The
design goal here is to avoid leakage of information of FU to
NU, while making sure that SIC works normally. To further
elaborate on this issue, it should be pointed out that there are
two types of SIC receiver: The first one is symbol-level SIC
receiver, in which FUs signal is demodulated but not decoded
in order to apply SIC, while the other one is codeword-level
SIC receiver, where FU’s signal is demodulated and decoded
in order to apply SIC [6]. In codeword-level-SIC case, the
data can only be secured by cryptography-based techniques.
However, for the case of symbol-level-SIC, PLS techniques
can be applied. In symbol-level based SIC, security can be
provided to FUs data by transforming its data into another
domain by using a special sequence such that NU can apply
SIC normally but cannot decode the information of FU [8].
Note that there is no significant work in the literature in this
direction.
2) Eavesdropping of NU by FU: In basic NOMA principle,
the FU has been allocated more power and it can decode its
signal directly considering the information of near as noise.
However, after obtaining its own signal it may detect the
signal of NU. The design goal here is to secure the data of
NU from FU while making sure that SIC work normally. In
this case, designing security methods is easier as compared
to the security problem of FUs data. The BS can employ
PLS techniques based on power allocation, beamforming or
any other adaptation-based algorithm to satisfy the security
requirement of NU while making sure that the basic data rate
requirement of FU is fulfilled [3].
C. Security Designs against both Internal and External Eaves-
droppers
In this scenario, there is an external eavesdropper as well
as an internal eavesdropper where the users in the network
are not trustable. The design goals here include: security of
signals intended for NU and FU from external eavesdropper
as well from each other. This case is the most challenging one
with respect to security design. The design algorithms should
make sure that SIC will work normally while fulfilling the
above goals. One possible way to provide security in this case
can be by the transformation of signal of near and far users
into another domain by using some randomization sequences
[8]. However, this is still an open research area and a lot of
research efforts are needed in this direction.
A summary of the objectives of security designs, complexity
and popular solutions for NOMA are presented in Table. I.
4TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE OBJECTIVES OF SECURITY DESIGNS FOR DIFFERENT SCENARIOS IN NOMA FOCUSING ON PASSIVE EXTERNAL EAVESDROPPER AND
ACTIVE INTERNAL EAVESDROPPER.
Scenarios for security Design objectives Design Complexity Candidate solutions
External Eavesdropper Securing NU and FU data against
external Eavesdropper while keep-
ing normal SIC
Normal Beamforming, Power allocation
based, interference exploitation
based, TAS, relay selection, etc.
Internal Eavesdropper Securing users information from
each other while ensuring normal
SIC
Against NU: High
Against FU: Normal
Against NU: Transformation of
FU to other domain
Against FU: Beamforming Power
allocation, TAS etc.
External and
Internal Eavesdropper
Securing users information from
each other as well as from external
Eve while having normal SIC
Highest Transformation of users’ signal
into another domain, interference
assisted, etc.
IV. MERITS OF PLS IN NOMA
In this section, we present some of the merits of NOMA
over OMA in terms of security under certain conditions.
A. Higher Sum-Secrecy Rate
In NOMA, the signals are not sent separately as compared
to OMA, hence, multi-user interference and PLS can be
processed collaboratively. Moreover, user selection, number
of users in each cluster, number of clusters, intra-cluster and
inter-cluster power allocation can be designed to enhance the
secrecy capacity of the system. For example, power allocation
based on channel conditions of legitimate users can make
interception of users signal difficult for eavesdropper under
certain settings as presented in Fig. 2 [9]. It should be noted
from the figure that the Average Sum Secrecy Rate (ASSR)
of NOMA system improves with the increase in the number
of users as compared to OMA under specific settings [9]. The
reason is that higher diversity gain (multi-user diversity) can
be offered in case of NOMA because the whole band can be
used by each user simultaneously [9].
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Fig. 2. Average Sum Secrecy Rate (ASSR) versus the transmit power for
different number of users (n=2, n=3, n=4).
B. Inter-User Interference Exploitation for Securing Massive
MIMO System
In the case of a massive MIMO system, Artificial Noise
(AN)-based security techniques face complexity issues. In
such cases, NOMA can help us to provide secure commu-
nication without using AN [10]. For example, consider a
clustering based Massive MIMO NOMA system employing
non-orthogonal channel estimation in the presence of mul-
tiple active eavesdroppers [10] as presented in Fig. 3. The
nodes in this system suffer from intra-cluster and inter-cluster
interference; however, this inter-user interference can be ex-
ploited intelligently to provide secure communication [10].
More specifically, power allocation coefficients during channel
estimation and multiples access stage can be designed in such
a way that it will enhance the performance of legitimate users
and degrade the performance of active eavesdroppers [10].
BS
Eve
Eve
Channel 1 Channel 4
Channel 2 Channel 3
Eve
Eve
Fig. 3. Secure massive MIMO with NOMA by using inter-user interference,
where users are divided into four clusters [10].
C. Link Adaptation for Secure Communication
Link adaptation using adaptive modulation, adaptive cod-
ing and optimal power allocation based on legitimate users
channels can provide some level of security [3]. It should be
pointed out that NOMA does not require exact channel state
information or fine feedback from users [11]. Hence, NOMA
5can respond to the changes in channel quickly and is capable
of link adaptation more easily, which is an attractive feature,
especially, for high speed mobile environment.
D. Securing Uni-Cast Message from Multi-Cast Receivers
An interesting advantage of NOMA is to secure uni-casting
message from interception by the untrusted multi-casting re-
ceivers while improving spectral efficiency [12] as presented
in Fig. 4, where uni-casting message is for specific receiver
while multi-casting message is for all the receivers in the set of
specific receivers. In OMA, uni-casting and multi-casting are
transmitted separately and can be intercepted easily by multi-
casting receivers as presented in Fig. 4. However, NOMA
principle can be used to degrade the intercepting capabilities of
the multi-casting receivers similar to the case of securing NU
message from untrusted FU receiver [12]. More specifically,
joint power allocation and beamforming strategies can be used
to enhance the secrecy of uni-casting message while preserv-
ing the reliability of multi-casting message [12]. Moreover, in
OMA, two slots are required to send uni-casting and multi-
casting information while in NOMA both information types
can be transmitted simultaneously by using a single slot [12]
as presented in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Multi-casting and Uni-casting in NOMA and OMA [12].
E. Channel Correlation and Security
Most, if not all, PLS techniques (based on small scale
fading) assume that the received signals at Eve and Bob
will experience independent fading, if they are roughly half
a wavelength apart [3]. This assumption is valid only in suffi-
ciently rich scattering environment. In case of poor scattering
environment, these algorithms will not ensure secure com-
munication. However, NOMA with large scale fading based
security algorithms can provide secure communication under
certain circumstances even in a poor scattering environment
[4][10]. Moreover, in case of rich scattering environment both
the small and large scale fading based security algorithms can
be applied in NOMA.
F. QoS based Security
NOMA has a great capability to support different QoS
requirements of different users, such as data rate and security.
More specifically, since users can be categorized based on
their QoS requirements, user scheduling, power allocation,
SIC decoding order, etc. can be designed to fulfill these re-
quirements. For example, in [13], an opportunistic hierarchical
security model for a 3D massive MIMO channel based on
NOMA is proposed for enhancing both security and spectral
efficiency as presented in Fig. 5. Particularly, the proposed
model can be used for transmitting multi-cast messages to
users with different security levels. The users are divided into
a high security group and a low security group [13]. The high
security group is further divided into NOMA group and non-
NOMA group, where the NOMA group signal is superimposed
onto the low security group signal [13]. The users included
in NOMA group have smaller path loss, lower power level
allocated to their signal by BS and have higher security level,
whereas the low security group has users with characteristics
of large path loss, low power allocation to their signal, and
lower level of security. In the proposed algorithm, multi-cast
beamforming, null space-based interference cancellation and
power control are employed for transmission of multi-cast
messages to different groups while fulfilling their security
requirements [13].
BS
Low security levelHigh security level
NOMA
Group
Low
security
group
Non-
NOMA
Group
Fig. 5. Opportunistic security model for massive MIMO based on NOMA
principle [13].
Note that the presented benefits are under certain settings
and there are situations where NOMA have marginal benefits
over OMA.
V. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
The development of new technologies gives rise to new
challenges that lead to interesting and new research areas.
This section presents the challenges in securing NOMA using
PLS alongside some of the proposed solutions and research
directions.
6A. Challenges for Security against FU and External Eaves-
droppers
There are considerable contributions in the literature regard-
ing the provision of secure communication schemes against
untrusted FU and external eavesdroppers (in case of trusted
internal users), such as channel dependent power alloca-
tion, beamforming, TAS and inter-user interference, etc. [3].
However, the majority of the research works assumes the
availability of full, partial or statistical information about
the channel state information of Eve, which is difficult to
achieve in case of passive eavesdropping. Moreover, some
techniques provide security at the cost of performance degra-
dation. Hence, conventional techniques should be intelligently
modified, and novel techniques should be proposed to provide
security for NOMA. Some of the potentially interesting tech-
niques like multi-dimensional directional modulation scheme,
cyclic feature suppression-based techniques and channel based
interleaving, etc. have not been explored for such cases,
whereas these techniques have the potential to be used in such
situations [3] [14].
B. Security Challenges against Untrusted NU and both Exter-
nal and Internal Eavesdroppers
The design of security algorithms against untrusted NU
and both internal and external eavesdropper is extremely
challenging. The only solutions available in the literature so far
are based on transformation of signals into another domain. In
these solutions, the signal transformation into another domain
is done by using a transformation sequence that needs to be
shared between the legitimate parties [8]. The sequence can be
shared by PLS approaches, such as full duplex jamming based
techniques for sequence sharing [8] which requires complex
hardware. In this direction, cross layer security techniques
can also be effective. For example, Automatic Repeat Request
(ARQ) with AN can be jointly designed to provide security
against internal and external eavesdropping in NOMA similar
to the work presented in [15]. Moreover, joint composite
constellation design and ARQ with adaptive modulation can
also be used to provide security against untrusted NU. In case
of rich scattering environment, channel-based manipulation
security techniques can also be employed in such scenarios.
This is still an open area and a lot of research efforts are
needed to provide security for such cases, while making sure
the SIC operation works normally.
C. Passivity and Limited Observations
A lot of techniques in the literature of secure NOMA con-
sider that the illegitimate user is just spying the information.
However, in future networks, there may exist illegitimate nodes
that can interfere with the normal operation of NOMA system
by active attacks, such as pilot spoofing attack, etc. These
attacks are more critical in NOMA because of the broadcast
of superimposed messages of multiple users at the same time.
Quite a few PLS techniques in the NOMA literature are robust
to active eavesdroppers case [10]. Hence, there is a need of
designing PLS techniques that are robust to active attacks from
eavesdroppers.
Moreover, multiple collaborative eavesdroppers with mul-
tiple observations may lead to zero secrecy capacity [14].
Hence, there is a need for understanding the implications of
multi-eavesdropper and multi-observation case while develop-
ing security techniques for NOMA communication.
D. SIC and Eve Capability
In the literature, it is assumed that the eavesdroppers use the
same SIC procedure as the legitimate users. However, eaves-
dropper can apply alternative strategies for eavesdropping, for
example, it may decode a signal in the first step that is decoded
in the last stage of SIC at legitimate users, which can affect the
overall security performance of the system. Possible alternative
approaches by eavesdropper should also be considered while
designing security algorithms.
E. SIC Error Propagation and Secrecy
The security algorithms in NOMA mainly rely on the
assumptions that perfect channel estimate is available, and
the signals are perfectly separated at the receiver side (per-
fect SIC). However, if there is an error in any of these
signals during SIC, then the remaining signals may also
have detected erroneously [6]. Hence, the effect of imperfect
SIC and imperfect channel estimation should be considered
while designing security algorithms for NOMA, so that these
drawbacks can be avoided. Therefore, it is also recommended
to use an efficient non-linear detection algorithm at each state
of SIC to alleviate the effect of imperfect SIC and practical
channel calibration solutions for imperfect channel estimation
case. Moreover, new interference cancellation schemes and
improvement in signal processing chip technology that can
benefit the legitimate receivers are also of special interest [1].
F. Artificial Noise (AN) based Security Schemes
AN based techniques are one of the popular techniques in
the literature. In these techniques, an artificial interference
signal is added in the null-space of legitimate user channel
to degrade the performance of Eve. However, in NOMA,
when AN is added based on individual user, it also causes
AN leakage in the range space of other NOMA users which
degrades their performance. Moreover, AN may increase Peak
to Average Power Ratio (PAPR), sacrifices some power and
is also sensitive to imperfect channel estimation. Thus, it is
recommended to design AN, not only to provide security but
also to reduce the amount of Out-Of-Band Emission (OOBE),
adjacent channel interference and average PAPR, etc. [15].
G. Multi-Cell Case and Other Technologies
In the case of multi-cell NOMA, there are a lot of challenges
to provide secure and reliable communication due to inter-
channel interference. However, there is no much work in this
area. Algorithms for joint processing, coordinated beamform-
ing, and coordinated scheduling need to be proposed to ensure
reliable and secure multi-cell NOMA.
7Moreover, there is also paucity of PLS research works for
NOMA integrated with other technologies such as millime-
ter wave, full-duplex, visible light communication, cognitive
radio, heterogeneous networks, and coordinated multi-point,
etc.
H. Cross-layer, Context Aware and Hybrid Security Tech-
niques for NOMA
In the literature of PLS techniques in NOMA, transmission
parameters of the physical layer are optimized according to
legitimate users’ channel characteristics to provide secure
communication without considering upper layer parameters.
However, to meet the diverse requirements of NOMA users
and for joint design of throughput, secrecy, delay, reliability
and respective trade-off among them, the concept of cross-
layer security design from the perspective of physical layer
should also be considered such as: 1) Cross MAC-PHY
layer: In this approach, MAC layer features (for example,
channel accessing, multiplexing, ARQ and control of resource
allocation, etc.) can be optimized jointly with physical layer
parameters to provide efficient QoS based security solution
[15], 2) Cross NET-PHY layer security: In this approach,
the network layer features such as relaying, routing and path
determination, etc. can be optimized jointly with physical
layer parameters for enhancing security of the system [14],
3) Cross APP-PHY layer: In this approach, physical layer
parameters of transmission are jointly optimized based on
channel characteristics as well as on the basis of applications,
services and features of data to provide efficient security
solution based on the requirements of users [3].
Finally, designing hybrid techniques by combining sig-
nals security approaches (PLS) with data security approaches
(cryptographic techniques) can further enhance the security of
the NOMA-based systems [3].
VI. CONCLUSION
NOMA promises high spectral efficiency, low latency and
massive connectivity, while PLS offers simple and effective
security solutions. Together, these two technologies are ca-
pable of supporting the exceeding efficiency and security
requirements of 5G and beyond networks. In this article, the
key security design requirements of NOMA and the strength of
PLS as a solution to fulfill these requirements are discussed.
By employing PLS to NOMA, spectrally efficient, adaptive
and secure systems can be realized. However, the challenges
and future recommendations explained in this work need to
be investigated further to address the open issues. Practical
secure NOMA systems can be developed by modification of
current PLS techniques and/or proposing new novel techniques
that do not require extra processing, extra signalling or major
modification in the receiver structure.
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